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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fernando Jorge DeSousa, seeking to avoid deportation 
for crimes he committed while a legal resident of the United 
States, applied for a discretionary waiver of inadmissibility 
under former 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c). The Board of Immigration 
Appeals ("BIA") ruled that as a deportable, rather than an 
excludable, alien, DeSousa was not eligible for a 
discretionary waiver. DeSousa then filed a petition for 
habeas corpus in the district court against the Attorney 
General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
("INS"), arguing that former S 1182(c), as applied by the 
BIA, violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause by irrationally 
distinguishing between aliens in deportation and in 
exclusion proceedings. The district court concluded that it 
had habeas corpus jurisdiction to hear DeSousa's claims 
and granted him a writ based on his equal protection 
challenge. Although we agree with the district court that 
recent changes in the immigration laws have not eliminated 
district courts' habeas jurisdiction over deportation-related 
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claims, at least in cases such as this in which deportation 
proceedings were instituted before April 1, 1997, the 
effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), we find that S 1182(c), as 
interpreted by the BIA, does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment's equal protection guarantee and therefore will 
reverse. 
 
II. JURISDICTION 
 
DeSousa claims that the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction over his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241. Whether changes in the immigration laws 
eliminated the district court's habeas jurisdiction over 
DeSousa's deportation-related challenge is the first issue 
presented by this appeal and is discussed fully below. We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 over the 
district court's final order granting DeSousa relief. 
 
III. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
 
Fernando Jorge DeSousa, a citizen of Portugal, entered 
the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 
December 1969. In the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, 
DeSousa was convicted of various crimes including 
aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, 
burglary and theft. For his second aggravated assault 
conviction in 1992, DeSousa served four and one-half years 
in prison. He was released from prison on December 15, 
1996. 
 
As an alien convicted of two crimes of moral turpitude 
and also as an aggravated felon, DeSousa became subject 
to deportation under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
("INA") S 241(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.S 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (two 
crimes of moral turpitude), and S 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (aggravated felony). 1 On October 28, 
1996, the INS issued an order to DeSousa to show cause 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. These sections are now renumbered as #8E8E # 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) and 
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and codified at 8 U.S.C. SS 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) and 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
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why he should not be deported because of his criminal 
convictions. 
 
At his immigration hearing, DeSousa sought to prevent 
his deportation by applying for a discretionary waiver of 
inadmissibility under former S 212(c) of the INA, codified at 
8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) (repealed 1996). At the time of DeSousa's 
convictions, S 212(c) permitted the Attorney General, in her 
discretion, to issue waivers to legal aliens who had traveled 
abroad voluntarily and were seeking entry back into the 
country but who would be excludable based on their 
criminal convictions. See former 8 U.S.C.S 1182(c) (1990).2 
Although the waiver provision applied on its face only to 
aliens in exclusion proceedings, the BIA and federal courts 
routinely had applied it to aliens in deportation proceedings 
as well. See, e.g., Katsis v. INS, 997 F.2d 1067, 1070 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The version of S 212(c) as amended in 1990 provided in relevant part: 
 
       Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily 
       proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, 
       and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
       consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the 
Attorney 
       General [despite being otherwise excludable].... The first sentence 
of 
       this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted 
       of an aggravated felony and has served a term of imprisonment of at 
       least 5 years. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) (1990). Then the last sentence was amended further 
in 1991 to provide that: "The first sentence of this subsection shall not 
apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or more aggravated 
felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of 
imprisonment of at least 5 years." 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) (1991). We see no 
material difference between the two versions, at least in the context of 
this case. 
 
3. It must be said that this application was sometimes questioned. See 
Morel v. INS, 90 F.3d 833, 842 (3d Cir. 1996) (Greenberg, J., dissenting 
opinion). At the time of the events at issue in this appeal, deportable 
aliens were defined in 8 U.S.C. S 1251(a) as those aliens who resided 
within the United States but who could be deported for certain reasons. 
In contrast, excludable aliens were defined in 8 U.S.C. S 1182(a) as those 
aliens who could be denied entry into the United States. IIRIRA, 
however, eliminated distinctions between exclusion and deportation 
proceedings. Under the current statutory structure, an immigration 
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Moreover, at the time of DeSousa's latest conviction in 
1992, S 212(c) waivers were unavailable only to those aliens 
who had been convicted of an aggravated felony, and who 
had served a term of imprisonment of at least five years for 
such felonies. See former 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) (1990). 
Although DeSousa's convictions qualified as aggravated 
felonies, see 8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(43) (1990), he nevertheless 
would have been eligible for a waiver under the previous 
version of S 212(c) because he had served a prison term of 
only four and one-half years for his convictions. 
 
The immigration judge found, however, that DeSousa was 
not eligible for the waiver under the new version ofS 212(c) 
enacted by S 440(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996). As amended, S 212(c) precludes 
"deportable" aliens who have been convicted of an 
aggravated felony or two crimes of moral turpitude from 
receiving waivers of inadmissibility, regardless of the prison 
term served for such crimes. See AEDPA S 440(d).4 
 
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision. 
Although DeSousa argued that new S 212(c) violated his 
right to equal protection by withdrawing waivers only from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
judge determines an alien's right either to be admitted to or to remain in 
the United States in a removal proceeding. See 8 U.S.C. S 1229a. 
Similarly, there is now a single provision, equally applicable to all 
aliens, 
that permits the Attorney General, in her discretion, to "cancel" the 
removal of an alien. See 8 U.S.C. S 1229b. 
 
4. AEDPA S 440(d), as itself amended byS 306(d) of the IIRIRA, amended 
INA S 212(c) to read: 
 
       The subsection shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by 
       reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in [INA] 
       S 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by 
section 
       241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without 
regard 
       to the date of their commission, otherwise covered by section 
       241(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 
Five months after the passage of AEDPA, Congress repealed S 212(c) in 
its entirety, effective April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA S 304(b). Because 
DeSousa's deportation proceedings were initiated in 1996, this repeal 
does not affect his case. 
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aliens in deportation proceedings, rather than from those in 
exclusion proceedings, the BIA, stating that it could not 
rule on the constitutionality of laws enacted by Congress, 
did not consider this argument on the merits. 
 
DeSousa then brought a habeas corpus proceeding in the 
district court under 28 U.S.C. S 2241 challenging the BIA's 
final order. See DeSousa v. Reno, 30 F. Supp.2d 844 (E.D. 
Pa. 1998). First, he contended that the BIA had erred in 
applying the new S 212(c) to him because his criminal 
convictions predated AEDPA's amendment of the statute. 
Second, DeSousa argued that even if new S 212(c) did apply 
to pre-AEDPA convictions, it violated the Fifth 
Amendment's equal protection guarantee by preventing only 
aliens in deportation proceedings, rather than those in 
exclusion proceedings, from applying for waivers. Thus, 
DeSousa sought an order directing the BIA to consider and 
rule on the merits of his application for a S 212(c) waiver. 
The Attorney General and the INS opposed DeSousa's 
application for a writ, arguing primarily that AEDPA as well 
as IIRIRA had eliminated habeas corpus jurisdiction over 
deportation-related claims. 
 
After a de novo review of a magistrate judge's report and 
recommendation, the district court granted a writ to 
DeSousa. It concluded first that neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA 
had eliminated its habeas jurisdiction over cases like 
DeSousa's. See DeSousa, 30 F. Supp.2d at 849. Then, it 
found that AEDPA S 440(d), which amended the INA waiver 
of inadmissibility provision, applied to cases pending at the 
time of its enactment and therefore also applied to DeSousa 
even though his criminal convictions predated AEDPA's 
effective date. See id. at 855. The court also ruled, however, 
that the amended S 212(c) violated DeSousa's right to equal 
protection of the law by drawing an irrational distinction 
between aliens subject to exclusion and those subject to 
deportation. See id. at 857. The Attorney General and the 
INS appeal, arguing that the court erred in finding habeas 
jurisdiction, and that even if such jurisdiction exists, 
S 212(c) is constitutional. 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Standard of Review 
 
The district court's conclusion that AEDPA and IIRIRA 
did not eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction over all 
deportation-related claims and that S 440(d) applies to pre- 
AEDPA convictions relies on statutory interpretation, which 
we review de novo. See Idahoan Fresh v. Advantage 
Produce, Inc., 157 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 1998). We also 
afford de novo review to the district court's conclusions 
regarding the constitutionality of S 440(d). See Anker 
Energy Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 169 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 
B. Did the District Court Have Jurisdiction Under 28 
   U.S.C. S 2241 to Review DeSousa's Habeas Petition 
   Challenging His Final Deportation Order on 
   Constitutional and Statutory Grounds? 
 
Recognizing that we recently have addressed the 
availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction after AEDPA and 
IIRIRA, the Attorney General and INS argue that a later 
Supreme Court decision requires us to reconsider our 
opinion in Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999). 
In Sandoval, as in this case, an alien sought habeas corpus 
review of a deportation order approved by the BIA. We held 
that the district courts continued to have habeas corpus 
jurisdiction to review deportation orders despite changes in 
the law created by AEDPA and IIRIRA. See Sandoval, 166 
F.3d at 238. The Attorney General and INS claim that Reno 
v. American-Arab Committee, 119 S.Ct. 936 (1999), 
undermines this conclusion. 
 
       1. Sandoval v. Reno 
 
In Sandoval, we addressed a case nearly identical to this 
one. Sandoval, like DeSousa, had petitioned for a writ of 
habeas corpus in a district court seeking relief from a 
deportation order. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 228. Because 
the effective date of most IIRIRA provisions was April 1, 
1997, and because Sandoval was placed in deportation 
proceedings before that date, Sandoval, like DeSousa, was 
not subject to IIRIRA's permanent rules. See id. at 229 n.1. 
 
                                7 
  
He was, however, subject to its transitional rules, and 
arguably to at least some of AEDPA's provisions, as that act 
became effective in April 1996, while Sandoval's case still 
was pending in the immigration courts. See id.  
 
The respondents in Sandoval argued that provisions in 
the new statutes precluded habeas corpus jurisdiction in a 
district court over aliens' challenges to deportation orders. 
See id. at 232-38. Relying on Supreme Court precedent 
establishing that only a clear statement of congressional 
intent could eliminate a statutory grant of jurisdiction to 
the district courts, we concluded that none of the 
provisions the respondents cited ended habeas corpus 
jurisdiction in cases like Sandoval's. See id. at 238. On this 
appeal, the Attorney General and the INS do not quarrel 
with this court's interpretation of two of the provisions 
discussed in Sandoval, AEDPA S 401(e) and IIRIRA 
S 309(c)(4)(G), a transitional rule. They do claim, however, 
that American-Arab requires this court to reconsider its 
construction of the other provision at issue in Sandoval, 
IIRIRA's amendment of INA S 242(g). 
 
IIRIRA S 306(a) amended INA S 242(g) to provide: 
 
       (g) Exclusive Jurisdiction. 
 
       Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding 
       any other provision of law, no court shall have 
       jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf 
       of any alien arising from the decision or action by the 
       Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
       cases, or execute removal orders against any alien 
       under this chapter. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1252(g) (1999). Unlike IIRIRA's other provisions, 
S 242(g) explicitly applies "to claims arising from all past, 
pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal 
proceedings." IIRIRA S 306(c)(1). Thus, although IIRIRA's 
permanent rules generally do not apply to individuals like 
DeSousa and Sandoval, whose deportation proceedings 
were initiated before IIRIRA's effective date, even they are 
subject to new S 242(g). See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 230. We 
ruled in Sandoval, however, that amendedS242(g) did not 
eliminate habeas corpus jurisdiction because it did not 
contain express language ending such jurisdiction. See id. 
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at 236-38. The Attorney General and INS argue that the 
American-Arab decision has undermined this holding. We 
disagree. 
 
       2. Reno v. American-Arab Committee 
 
The issue before the Supreme Court in American-Arab 
was whether S 242(g) had deprived the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to review the respondents' claim that the 
Attorney General was selectively enforcing the immigration 
laws. See American-Arab, 119 S.Ct. at 940. After the 
government had instituted deportation proceedings against 
them, the respondents in American-Arab brought suit in a 
district court, challenging the constitutionality of a relevant 
statute, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Attorney General, the INS, and various 
immigration officials. See id. at 938-39. Eventually, the 
respondents amended their complaint to include a claim 
that the government had targeted them for deportation, in 
violation of their First Amendment rights, because of their 
participation in the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, a group that the government "characterizes as an 
international terrorist and communist organization." Id. at 
938, 939. The respondents argued that the government did 
not enforce routine status requirements against immigrants 
who were not members of disfavored terrorist groups. See 
id. at 939. 
 
In addressing whether S 242(g) deprived the district court 
of jurisdiction over respondents' selective enforcement 
claim, the Supreme Court stated that the new section 
applies to cases that involve three specific decisions made 
by the executive: decisions to "commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." See id. at 943 
(emphasis by Supreme Court). The Court stated that it 
made sense for Congress to target these three stages 
because at each stage the INS has discretion to abandon 
the endeavor, and at the time S 242(g) was enacted, the INS 
routinely had been defending suits challenging its exercise 
of discretion in deportation cases. See id. at 943-44. These 
suits stemmed from the INS's practice of "deferred action": 
its willingness to choose not to deport based on 
humanitarian reasons or for its own convenience. See id. at 
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943. Those individuals who failed to benefit from such 
discretion were challenging the INS's decisions, and 
therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned, Congress had 
sought to preclude such suits. See id. at 944. The Court 
stated: "Section [242(g)] seems clearly designed to give some 
measure of protection to `no deferred action' decisions and 
similar discretionary determinations, providing that if they 
are reviewable at all, they at least will not be made the 
bases for separate rounds of judicial intervention outside 
the streamlined process that Congress has designed." Id. 
Thus, the Court found that S 242(g) was a narrow provision, 
"directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose 
judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 
n.9. 
 
The Attorney General and INS argue in this case that 
S 242(g) precludes DeSousa's habeas corpus suit even 
though DeSousa brought a constitutional and statutory 
challenge in his petition rather than a selective enforcement 
claim. They claim that S 242(g) bars DeSousa's suit because 
the suit, in essence, seeks to stop the government from 
"executing" a deportation order. Clearly, then, they view 
S 242(g) as an extremely broad provision that would apply 
to every deportation-related challenge, because every such 
challenge could be deemed a suit to stop the "execution" of 
a deportation order.5 
 
The Supreme Court, however, explicitly rejected a broad 
interpretation of S 242(g) in American-Arab. As in this case, 
the Attorney General argued in American-Arab that S 242(g) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It is possible that the Attorney General and INS are making a different 
argument and suggesting that because DeSousa ultimately seeks a 
discretionary waiver of inadmissibility, his case is covered by S 242(g). 
It 
is true that the government's refusal to grant DeSousa a S 212(c) waiver, 
if he were eligible for such a waiver under the statute, might be the kind 
of discretionary decision that S 242(g) was designed to protect. 
Currently, 
however, the unavailability of the waiver to DeSousa does not depend on 
governmental discretion and instead is required by the language of the 
statute itself. Thus, by challenging the statute's constitutionality and 
its 
alleged retroactivity, DeSousa is not challenging the government's 
exercise of discretion. He merely seeks to have us interpret the statute 
in his favor and then send his case back to the BIA for consideration of 
his application for a waiver. 
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requires aliens "to bring all deportation-related claims in the 
context of a petition for review of a final order of 
deportation filed in the court of appeals." Id. at 941 
(emphasis added). The heart of the Court's opinion was the 
rejection of this interpretation because it would have 
rendered IIRIRA's effective date provision, S 309(c)(1), a 
nullity. See id. at 941-43. The Court reasoned that because 
IIRIRA S 306 instructs that S 242(g) applies to previous and 
pending cases, to interpret S 242(g) as applying to all 
deportation-related claims would render senseless 
S 309(c)(1), which states that IIRIRA generally does not 
apply to previous or pending cases. See id. According to the 
Court, the only interpretation that squared S 306 and S 309 
was one that viewed S 242(g) as affecting a narrow class of 
cases. See id. at 943. Thus, the Supreme Court in 
American-Arab clearly rejected the interpretation of S 242(g) 
that the Attorney General and INS advance here. 
 
Because S 242(g) only applies to suits challenging the 
government's selective enforcement of the immigration laws, 
and because DeSousa's case was not brought on this 
ground, S 242(g) does not bar his suit. See Richardson v. 
Reno, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL 496241, at *2 (11th Cir. July 
14, 1999) (interpreting American-Arab and ruling that 
S 242(g) did not bar a habeas corpus petition that did not 
challenge a decison to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases or execute removal proceedings).6  As S 242(g) does not 
apply to DeSousa, and American-Arab did not affect the 
remainder of Sandoval's rulings, Sandoval remains the law 
governing cases like DeSousa's. Under Sandoval, the 
district court had jurisdiction to consider DeSousa's habeas 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Richardson held that habeas jurisdiction was not available in that case 
but predicated its opinion on post-IIRIRA law as Richardson was placed 
in removal proceedings after IIRIRA's effective date. See Richardson 1999 
WL 496241, at *6 n.2. Accordingly, Richardson  distinguished Sandoval 
because Sandoval was a pre-IIRIRA case so that only the IIRIRA 
transitional provisions applied. Id. Thus, the Richardson court explained 
that Sandoval did "not involve the full, and extensive, revisions to the 
INA's judicial review scheme" under INA S 242 as amended by IIRIRA. 
This case, like Sandoval, also involves only IIRIRA transitional rules. 
Therefore, we have no reason to consider whether we agree with 
Richardson. 
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petition, including both his constitutional and statutory 
claims. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 238. 
 
C. Does New S 212(c) Violate DeSousa's R ight to Equal 
   Protection of the Law? 
 
DeSousa argues, and the district court found, that new 
S 212(c) is unconstitutional because it irrationally 
distinguishes between aliens in exclusion and in 
deportation proceedings. We disagree. 
 
DeSousa's equal protection challenge to amendedS 212(c) 
stems from the BIA's decision in a different case, Matter of 
Fuentes-Campos, Interim Decision 3318 (BIA 1997). In 
Fuentes-Campos, the BIA addressed whether the 
amendment to S 212(c) prohibiting "deportable" aliens with 
aggravated felony or multiple moral turpitude convictions 
from applying for waivers also applied to aliens in exclusion 
proceedings. Focusing on the term "deportable" in the 
amendment, the BIA ruled that new S 212(c) only barred 
aliens in deportation proceedings, and not those in 
exclusion proceedings, from applying for waivers. On this 
appeal, both the Attorney General and DeSousa acquiesce 
in the BIA's interpretation of Congressional intent in 
amending the statute. Because of the parties' agreement on 
this issue, we assume, without deciding, that the BIA 
correctly construed S 212(c) when it concluded that only 
aliens in deportation proceedings convicted of the specified 
crimes are barred from applying for discretionary waivers.7 
We therefore turn to address whether Congress's decision 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our decision not to question the BIA's conclusions in Fuentes-Campos 
is also influenced by the fact that S 212(c)'s amended version was in 
force for a limited time. Because IIRIRA repealed this section in its 
entirety and replaced it with new INA S 240(a), which permits 
discretionary "cancellation of removal" and explicitly applies to all 
criminal aliens, amended S 212(c) was only in effect from the date of 
AEDPA's passage on April 24, 1996, until the effective date of IIRIRA, 
April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA S 304(a) (repealing former S 212(c) in its 
entirety effective April 1, 1997); 8 U.S.C. S 1229b(a) (codifying new INA 
S 240(a)). We do note, however, that at least one court of appeals has 
found the BIA's construction of S 212(c) to be clearly contrary to the 
plain meaning of the statute. See United States v. Estrada-Torres, 179 
F.3d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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to distinguish between deportable and excludable aliens 
violates DeSousa's right to equal protection of the laws. 
 
DeSousa's equal protection argument rests primarily on 
his claim that from the time that the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit decided Francis, courts have recognized 
without exception the irrationality of distinguishing 
between deportable and excludable aliens. A careful reading 
of Francis, however, reveals that it did not directly concern 
distinctions between excludable and deportable aliens, but 
rather addressed disparate treatment of groups of 
deportable aliens. Indeed it appears that over the years, by 
force of repetition, Francis has come to stand for a rule of 
law that its facts do not support. 
 
In Francis, the court of appeals considered a series of 
decisions by the BIA that had extended S 212(c) relief, 
which on its face applied only to aliens in exclusion 
proceedings, to certain aliens in deportation proceedings. 
First, in Matter of G. A., 7 I. & N. 274 Dec. (1956), the BIA 
found an alien eligible for S 212(c) relief because he had left 
temporarily and then returned to the United States after he 
had become deportable. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 271. The 
BIA reasoned that since the alien would have been eligible 
for S 212(c) relief if the INS had placed him into exclusion 
proceedings at the time he sought reentry, relief could be 
granted at his later deportation hearing. See id. Second, in 
Matter of Smith, 11 I. & N. Dec. 325 (1965), the BIA 
construed S 212(c) to apply to deportation proceedings 
where an alien had requested an adjustment of status 
under S 245 of the INA. See id. It concluded that because 
the S 245 application subjected the alien to all bases for 
exclusion, the alien should also benefit from the waiver 
available in exclusion proceedings. See id. At the same 
time, however, the BIA continued to refuse to grantS 212(c) 
relief to an individual who did not fall into one of the above 
two groups of deportable aliens. See id. 
 
The petitioner in Francis argued that through its 
interpretations, the BIA had created two classes of aliens 
identical in every respect except for the fact that, after 
becoming deportable, members of one class had departed 
and returned to this country without being stopped at the 
border. See id. at 272. He claimed that the BIA's extension 
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of S 212 relief to certain deportable aliens and not others 
violated his right to equal protection. The Francis court 
agreed with the petitioner's claim, finding that there was no 
rational basis for rewarding with a potential waiver only 
those deportable aliens who temporarily left the country 
and returned without triggering exclusion proceedings at 
the border. 
 
But distinguishing between groups of deportable aliens 
is, of course, not the issue in this appeal. Instead, the issue 
we must decide, whether Congress can constitutionally 
differentiate between excludable and deportable aliens, 
simply was not addressed in Francis. Similarly, although we 
have adopted the reasoning of Francis, this adoption should 
stand for no more than Francis itself represented: the 
conclusion that the distinctions drawn by the BIA among 
certain deportable aliens were irrational. See, e.g., Katsis v. 
INS, 997 F.2d at 1070. In this appeal we therefore are 
confronted with addressing, for the first time, whether a 
Congressional grant of discretionary relief to excludable, 
but not deportable, aliens violates the Fifth Amendment's 
equal protection guarantee. 
 
It is undisputable that our constitution provides due 
process and equal protection guarantees to aliens as well as 
citizens. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 
1064, 1070 (1886). But as DeSousa concedes and as the 
Francis court recognized, disparate treatment of different 
groups of aliens triggers only rational basis review under 
equal protection doctrine. See Francis, 532 F.2d at 272. 
Under this minimal standard of review, a classification is 
accorded "a strong presumption of validity" and the 
government has no obligation to produce evidence to 
sustain its rationality. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 
320, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 2642, 2643 (1993). Indeed, such a 
classification can be upheld as constitutional even when it 
is based on rational speculation rather than on empirical 
data. See id., 509 U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2643. Once a 
facially legitimate reason for the classification is found, 
whether such a reason was articulated by Congress or not, 
we must rule the classification constitutional. See id., 509 
U.S. at 320, 113 S.Ct. at 2642. As always, when performing 
such review, our role is not to judge the wisdom or fairness 
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of Congress's policy choices, but rather their 
constitutionality. See id., 509 U.S. at 319, 113 S.Ct. at 
2642. 
 
The legislative history of AEDPA clearly demonstrates 
that Congress's goal in amending S 212(c) was to enhance 
"the ability of the United States to deport criminal aliens." 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 119 (1996), reprinted in 
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 952.8 In order to aid the United 
States in expelling criminal aliens from the country, 
Congress rationally could have decided to encourage such 
aliens to voluntarily leave the country as a carrot to a 
potential waiver of removal when they sought reentry. 
Creating such an incentive may have appeared desirable to 
Congress for several reasons. First, Congress could have 
rationally speculated that not all aliens who voluntarily left 
the country would return. Second, because exclusion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Indeed, the history of Congress's amendments to S 212(c) shows that, 
throughout the 1990s, it had been tightening the controls over granting 
such waivers. Before 1990, S 212(c) contained no bar to seeking a 
discretionary waiver. Thus, as the section was applied through case law, 
all aliens in deportation and exclusion proceedings, even those convicted 
of aggravated felonies, were eligible to apply for a waiver. See 
Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1519 (3d Cir. 1996). In 1990, 
however, Congress enacted an amendment restricting the availability of 
S 212(c) relief. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, 
S 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 (1990). Under the new amendment, aliens 
who had been "convicted of an aggravated felony and ha[d] served a term 
of imprisonment of at least 5 years" were barred from applying for 
waivers. 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) (1990). There was a further immaterial 
amendment in 1991. See note 2, supra. 
 
Moreover, in 1990 and 1994, Congress expanded the definition of 
"aggravated felony" to include more classes of crimes. See Immigration 
Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-649, S 501(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5048 (1990); 
Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub.L. 
No. 103-416 S 222(a), 108 Stat. 4305, 4322 (1994). These amendments 
rendered an even greater number of aliens ineligible for discretionary 
relief. Finally, with the passage of AEDPA in 1996, Congress enacted the 
latest version of S 212(c), which is at issue in this appeal. This version 
makes waivers unavailable to all aliens who are "deportable" by reason 
of having committed an aggravated felony or at least two crimes of moral 
turpitude, regardless of the time served for such crimes. See 8 U.S.C. 
S 1182(c) (1996). 
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proceedings provide fewer procedural protections than 
deportation proceedings, Congress may have reasoned that 
encouraging aliens to seek waivers through the exclusion 
process would decrease the United States' administrative 
costs in expelling criminal aliens. See Landon v. Plasencia, 
459 U.S. 21, 26-27, 103 S.Ct. 321, 325-26 (1982). We 
recognize that such a policy might appear callous to the 
affected individuals and their families. But, because there 
is a rational reason for distinguishing between deportable 
and excludable criminal aliens in the context of Congress's 
policy to expel such aliens from the country, the distinction 
drawn in S 212(c) does not violate DeSousa's right to equal 
protection of the law. See LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 
1041 (7th Cir. 1998) (rejecting, on similar grounds, 
identical equal protection challenge to amendedS 212(c)). 
 
D. Alternatively, Is New S 212(c) Impermissibly 
   Retroactive When Applied to DeSousa? 
 
DeSousa argues that even if we reverse the district 
court's equal protection ruling, we can affirm on the 
alternate ground that amended S 212(c) is retroactive as 
applied to him. But DeSousa's mention of the retroactivity 
argument in his appellate brief substantially is limited to 
two short sentences that state: "[T]his Court can affirm the 
decision of the district court under the reasoning set forth 
in Sandoval, supra, i.e. principles of retroactivity" and "In 
the alternative, this Court should affirm the decision of the 
district court under the reasoning expressed in Sandoval v. 
Reno, et al., 166 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 1999)." However, 
Sandoval concerned whether amended S 212(c) could be 
applied to proceedings pending before AEDPA's effective 
date and concluded that it could not so apply. See 
Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 242. This reasoning is irrelevant to 
DeSousa's case because the INS began his deportation 
proceedings after AEDPA's effective date. As a result, we 
cannot affirm the district court's decision based on "the 
reasoning set forth in Sandoval." 
 
It appears, however, that in the district court, DeSousa 
had argued that AEDPA was retroactive as applied to him 
because the underlying criminal convictions rendering him 
ineligible for discretionary relief occurred prior to AEDPA's 
effective date. Although DeSousa has failed to raise this 
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issue specifically in his brief argument regarding 
retroactivity, out of an abundance of caution, we 
nevertheless address this argument. 
 
The first step in a retroactivity analysis is to determine 
whether Congress has expressed its views on the temporal 
reach of the statute. See Sandoval, 166 F.3d at 240 (citing 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 
1483, 1505 (1994)). If it has, our role is simply to enforce 
congressional intent. See id. 
 
The text of S 212(c) provides support for the view that 
pre-AEDPA convictions may be considered in denying relief. 
The section, as applicable here, provides that waivers will 
not be available to "an alien who is deportable by reason of 
having committed any criminal offense." 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c) 
(1996). The past tense of the underlined verb suggests that 
on AEDPA's effective date, those who, like DeSousa,"have 
committed" the specified criminal offense would be 
ineligible for the waivers. 
 
IIRIRA's amendment of S 212(c) also suggests that 
Congress intended for earlier convictions to be considered. 
In S 306(d) of IIRIRA, Congress made a technical correction 
to S 212(c), and specifically provided that the correction was 
retroactive to AEDPA's effective date. This correction 
changed the section's language to provide: "This subsection 
shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by reason of 
having committed any criminal offense . . . covered by 
section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are 
without regard to the date of their commission, otherwise 
covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)." IIRIRA S 306(d) 
(underlined text added by IIRIRA). INA Sections 
241(a)(2)(A)(i) and (ii) concern moral turpitude convictions. 
Importantly, subsection (i) states that an alien is deportable 
for a single moral turpitude conviction if the conviction 
occurs within a specified number of years from the date of 
admission, and the crime carries a potential sentence of 
one year or more. See 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). 
 
Given the language of subsection (i), Congress may have 
intended that the technical correction simply eliminate the 
requirement that a moral turpitude conviction must have 
occurred within a specified number of years from 
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admission. On the other hand, given Congress's failure to 
limit its language, the phrase "without regard to the date of 
their commission" suggests that any two moral turpitude 
convictions, even those that pre-date AEDPA, would render 
an alien ineligible for a waiver. 
 
The inclusion of limiting language in another related 
AEDPA section provides further evidence that Congress 
intended amended S 212(c) to apply to individuals with pre- 
AEDPA convictions. In S 440(f), Congress provided that 
"[t]he amendments made by subsection (e) shall apply to 
convictions entered on or after the date of the enactment of 
this Act . . . ." AEDPA S 440(f). By implication then, we can 
assume that Congress intended for S 440(d) to apply to all 
convictions, regardless of their date. See Sandoval, 166 
F.3d at 241 ("Where Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section 
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.") (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
Even though traditional rules of statutory construction 
suggest that pre-AEDPA convictions are to be considered in 
denying waivers, because the evidence is not absolutely 
clear, we proceed to the next step in the retroactivity 
analysis, whether the statute has a retroactive effect. See 
Collins v. Montgomery County Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 176 
F.3d 679, 685 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc); Sandoval , 166 F.3d 
at 240. On this issue, our precedent requires us tofind 
that S 212(c) does not have "retroactive effect" even though 
it removes discretionary relief for pre-AEDPA convictions. 
See Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1523 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
In Scheidemann, we considered two separate 
amendments to S 212(c): the first was the addition of the 
bar to waiver eligibility for aggravated felons, and the 
second was an expansion of the definition of "aggravated 
felony" to encompass a greater variety of crimes. See id. at 
1519-20. The petitioner argued that because at the time of 
his conviction there was no statutory bar to waiver 
eligibility and his crime was not defined as an aggravated 
felony, the amendments should not apply to his deportation 
proceeding even though it was initiated after the effective 
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date of the amendments. See id. at 1520. Thus, the 
retroactivity issue before us in Scheidemann was 
substantively identical to that before us on this appeal. 
 
We resolved this issue by holding that the amendments 
did not have a retroactive effect. We stated: 
 
       [T]he consequences of petitioner's criminal conduct 
       were clear at the time of that conduct and they remain 
       unchanged today. He was subject to possible criminal 
       sanctions and deportation. The only relevant change in 
       the law relates to the permissible scope of the Attorney 
       General's discretion to grant relief from one of those 
       consequences. Like statutes altering the standards for 
       injunctive relief, this change has only a prospective 
       impact. It is not designed to remedy the past but only 
       to affect petitioner's future status with regard to the 
       legality of his presence in the United States. 
 
Scheidemann, 83 F.3d at 1523. The above reasoning clearly 
applies to DeSousa's claims on this appeal and therefore 
requires the finding that amended S 212(c) does not have 
retroactive effect. 
 
Because S 212(c) does not have retroactive effect, courts 
construing it should "apply the law in effect at the time . . . 
[of] decision." Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 264, 114 S.Ct. at 1496. 
At the time of both the BIA's and the district court's 
decisions in DeSousa's case, amended S 212(c) was in effect 
and provided that waivers were unavailable to those aliens 
who were deportable "by reason of having committed" an 
aggravated felony or two crimes of moral turpitude. 
Because DeSousa was deportable by reason of having 
committed such crimes, the courts correctly found that he 
was ineligible for a waiver. We therefore reject DeSousa's 
alternative ground for affirmance. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
We will affirm the district court's ruling that it had 
habeas jurisdiction to review DeSousa's challenge to his 
deportation order. Furthermore, we will affirm itsfinding 
that Congress intended amended S 212(c) to apply to 
individuals in DeSousa's situtation, and as applied,S 212(c) 
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is not retroactive. However, we will reverse the district 
court's grant of a writ to DeSousa because we conclude 
that the distinction between excludable and deportable 
aliens drawn in amended S 212(c) does not violate the equal 
protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. Accordingly, we will remand the case to the district 
court to dismiss DeSousa's petition. 
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